Mitigating the proliferation of 3D-printed small arms and light weapons

The production of 3D-printed small arms and light weapons (SALW) has increased significantly since 2020, particularly in regions such as North America, Western Europe, Australia and Latin America. The ‘plastic pipeline’  has been primarily linked to criminal actors associated with organized crime, narcotics and illicit weapons manufacturing and trafficking networks. There have also been at least 52 documented incidents of extremist engagement with these weapons between January 2017 and August 2025. Though 3D-printed SALW are still on the periphery of the illicit arms spectrum, the commercial availability of this technology, coupled with reducing barriers to entry facilitated by the spread of knowledge online, has led the international community to call for action to address their illicit proliferation and misuse. 

The 4th Review Conference of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade of Small and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA) and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI), held in 2024, established an open-ended technical expert group (OETEG) to develop recommendations for the full and effective implementation of these instruments in light of developments in SALW manufacturing, technology and design. The first meeting of the OETEG takes place in New York this week and will examine measures to counter illicit 3D-printing of SALW, alongside other issues. Several considerations are outlined below for national and international experts as they seek to identify effective strategic and operational measures to enable States to implement the PoA and ITI in preventing the illicit 3D printing of SALW. 

Why is 3D-printing a problem for SALW control?

The UN PoA and ITI provide a series of measures that States should take to counter the illicit manufacture and trafficking of SALW. 3D-printing of SALW poses several challenges for PoA and ITI implementation, including: